PART 2 - The Malaysia Connections (THAILAND)


CROSS BORDER TERRORISM: THE LINK BETWEEN MALAYSIA MILITANT GROUP (KMM) & JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH (JI) - CONNECTION AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY
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Article by: Dr Mizan Aslam
PART 2 - The Malaysia Connections (THAILAND)


The Malaysia Connections

Malaysia as terrorism hub for Southeast Asia would be hard to believe by the government as well as people in this most modern and liberal Islamic country. However, radicalism movement in neighbouring countries and militant activities in Malaysia showed how true this accusation. Malaysia significantly played major role in accommodating violence and militant activities since 80s. Writer will discuss how Malaysia was used by militants in organizing violence activities in this region particularly in Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar as well as Cambodia.

Thailand

This country also known as ‘White Elephant Kingdom’, located in northern side of Malaysia with 63 million populations. Yet, majority of population are Buddhists, southerners in three provinces Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani are Muslims and known as Malays. They are sharing similarities in religion, language, writing and culture with Malaysian who lives in Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Perak states in Malaysia. Diplomatic relationship between these two countries existed since centuries ago and was marked by yearly obeisance paid by Kedah state to Siam kingdom. However, family and cultural relationship keep on going until current.

The movement between Thailandists and Malaysians in borderline happened in such a good manners until 1940s. After Japan surrendered in 1945, communists use northern state of Malaysia as their periphery because of easy access to Thailand and relatively remote area hardly use by human. Some of the communists especially Muslims were helped and sheltered by southern Thailand separatists who also work at the border. When communist’s threat was over, the connections more on criminal rings such as firearms and good smuggling as well as drugs trafficking.

In the wake of Islamization in Malaysia, efforts have been taken by some of the KMM leaders on firearms dealing. However, most of the transactions were failed and cheated by ‘mediator’. Tajudin, Zulkifli a.k.a Musa Khir, Adnan Mohd Daud, Zainuri Kamarudin Zainon Ismail, Nik Adli, Fauzi, and respondents A, D, E, F and J were involved in arms dealing especially with representatives from Southern Thailand who were believed able to help them find arms. Respondent D with Zainon Ismail bought Smith & Wesson .38 revolvers and a large number of bullets from Southern Thailand in the early 1990s. They also bought one more revolver, two M16s, gun magazines, more than 200 M16 bullets, 4 kilograms of TNT explosive materials, and one hand grenade from Southern Thailand, in total costing over RM20,000.

Thailand also glanced by JI and al-Qaeda as their prospect militant activities based. Using their representative in Malaysia, al-Qaeda was organizing series of meeting and visits to strengthen their capability in Thailand. However, few incidents related with international terrorist organizations discovered such as the failure of the bombing operation of the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok on March 2004 has proven links with al-Qaeda. General Surayud Chulanont of the Thailand army, admitted military intelligence was monitoring a ‘small number’ of Bin Laden operatives operating in Thailand. It is known that al-Qaeda has shifted its training base and financial operations from the Middle East to Southeast Asia following 9/11.

Several Thai Muslims have been detained because of their links either to al-Qaeda or JI. For example, on May 28, 2003, two Thai nationals, who were affiliated with the al-Qaeda front Om al-Qura Foundation, were arrested in Cambodia. On June 10, 2003 Ariffin bin Ali (John Wong Ah Hung) was arrested in Bangkok. Ariffin ran the JI Singapore operative at Bangkok and had plans to attacks Western embassies and tourist venues in Pattaya and Phuket Island. In 2002, Dr. Ismail Lutfi rector of Yala Islamic College was detained because of his radical ideas. And in March 2002, 25 Middle Eastern men were arrested in Bangkok for suspected of involvement in money laundering al-Qaeda funds.

Hambali, who already build strong base in Malaysia also suggested bombing a tourist centre in Phuket Island, Thailand in early 2000. Hambali appointed Yazid Sufaat (a leader of the Selangor & Kuala Lumpur cell) to go to Phuket for surveillance. Hambali asked Fatah (who had attended the Rabitatul Mujahidin meeting a year before) to provide assistance for this project. Hambali wanted Thai national assistance for Sufaat. Abu Hisham, an Afghan-alumnus was chosen for this two-week assignment. Later, a three-page surveillance report was forwarded by Hambali to KSM, but this operation was abandoned after disagreement with Fatah. Fatah and his Afghan-alumnus were reluctant to get involved, fearing it would have a negative impact on his own Islamic network in Southern Thailand.

JI established networks with their Afghan members and not with the local leaders. However, JI tried hard to develop close contacts with separatists and was also willing to channel some funds for violent activities. But, Abdul Fatah, the JI mediator was reluctant to make this initiative a reality. Fatah also worried that his close contact with local separatists would land him in trouble if he tried to stir up the situation there. Bringing in JI as a new faction and thus allowing for the possibility of new attacks would have worsened Southern Thailand’s situation.

This kind of movement was clearly different from the one in the Southern Philippines and Ambon as well as Rohingyans. The Southern Philippines and Ambon were more about a religious clash between Islam and Christianity; Rohingyans involved the conflict caused by ethnic and religious cleansing by the Burmese junta. The situation in the Philippines, Ambon and Myanmar was considered paramount for Muslims to perform Jihad against infidels. This is why JI wanted to get involved in Myanmar and the Southern Philippines - because the ‘Jihad door’ was open. The Southern Thailand situation was more related to a nationalist movement rather than Jihad against the Bangkok administration.

Two groups in Thailand, Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani (GMIP) and Wae Ka Raeh (WKR), reputedly a veteran of Afghanistan war, were alleged to have ties with JI and al-Qaeda. When JI suspects from elsewhere in the region fled to Southern Thailand in the aftermath of the arrests by Singapore and Malaysian police in December 2001, they were given a safe haven by Thai Muslims. In June 2003, Thai authorities picked up three Muslim community leaders on suspicion of planning major bomb attacks against foreign embassies and tourist spots as part of JI plots. They were religious teacher Maisuri Haji Abdullah, Mayahi Haji Doloh and Wae Mahdi Wae-dao; all prominent community leaders in Southern Thailand. Until his arrest on August 11, 2003, Hambali was able to get shelter from the Thai Muslim community especially from the Afghan-alumnus networking in Thailand.

U.S officials, in particular FBI officials, were incensed that Hambali, the Jamaah Islamiyah leader, was able to hold a major policy meeting in Bangkok in which the Bali attack was planned .

In March 2002, Thailand and the U.S uncovered an important document related to an al-Qaeda operation in Bangkok. Later, 13 people were arrested for alleged involvement in al-Qaeda activities in Thailand. Following this, Thailand began the investigation of three firms that had suspected links to al-Qaeda in 2002. Ties between Thailand and ASEAN countries, particularly Singapore were established. On 16 May, 2003, Arifin bin Ali, a senior JI leader form Singapore was detained in Bangkok. Arifin was extradited to Singapore immediately after the arrest. And later, a follow-up joint operation between Thailand and Singaporean officials with the help from CIA and FBI officials led to the arrest of three JI members in Southern Thailand on June 10, 2002.



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