Following the five-month Marawi siege in
the Philippines starting in May 2017 in which leading Southeast Asian jihadists
such as Isnilon Hapilon and Omar Maute, from the Philippines, and Dr Mahmood
Ahmad and Amin Baco, both Malaysians, were killed, many analysts believed the
terrorist threat in the region had been largely neutralised.
Yet in the last two years, security forces
in Southeast Asia continue to foil potential attacks and arrest networks of
mainly Islamic State (IS)-linked operatives.
In this period, around 519 individuals in
Malaysia and another 500 in Indonesia have been remanded, while authorities in
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines have also dismantled networks of
suspected IS cells and supporters.
LEADERSHIP REJUVENATION
Recent reports of senior Malaysian
militants Akel Zainal and Rafi Udin being killed in counter-terrorist
operations in Syria have meant there are currently no known Southeast Asian
fighters holding leadership positions within IS in Syria and Iraq.
This is significant as a living Southeast
Asian fighter stands a greater chance of being accepted as ‘the’ leader of IS’
affiliate networks in the region, having earned the status of having fought and
survived the ‘jihad’ in the Middle East.
There is thus interest in who will emerge
to lead the various IS networks affected by leadership losses in Southeast
Asia. In Indonesia, veteran ideologues such as Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar
Baasyir remain alive, albeit in remand, and continue to have some influence on
their specific radical circles in Indonesia specifically.
However, the Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD),
the largest terrorist group in the country, currently operates as a loose
network of autonomous pro-IS cells, following significant losses to its central
and provincial leadership in recent years.
In the Philippines, there are known persons
(such as Hatib Sawadjaan and Furuji Indama, who helm IS’ branches in Sulu and
Basilan provinces respectively) who have emerged to lead IS-linked groups
there. In contrast, Malaysian IS networks have been disrupted by the recent
loss of key figures such as Akel and Rafi.
Going forward, with IS affiliates worldwide
retaking their pledges of allegiance to the newly declared IS leader Abu
Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi, including networks in Southeast Asia, it is
likely new individuals will emerge into leadership roles, possibly from the
pool of regional militants returning from the Middle East or among the kin of
dead IS terrorists.
POST-CALIPHATE LANDSCAPE
According to estimates, nearly 1,000
Indonesians, 100 Malaysians and some nationals from the Philippines and
Singapore had journeyed (hijrah) to IS-controlled territory in Syria during the
height of its caliphate operations between 2015 and 2017.
Since then, some 85 Indonesians and 40
Malaysians have been reportedly killed in battle, many of them male suicide
bombers.
Several of these ideologically hardened and
combat ready fighters could seek to return home, following IS’ territorial
losses in Syria; many are currently either held in prison and detention camps, or
still fighting for IS’ remaining networks there.
Having developed ideological affinity,
shared experiences in battle and formed close personal ties with fighters from
within and outside Southeast Asia, they could seek to form alliances to
coordinate terror operations around the region once back home.
There is clear precedent for such a
scenario. During the 1980s, many Southeast Asian jihadists migrated to
Afghanistan to join the so-called jihad against Soviet occupation.
Several who subsequently returned formed
the nucleus of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which was responsible for
high-profile terrorist attacks in the 1990s and early 2000s.
For IS, whose regional affiliates are
already among the most organised in Asia, the prospective return of battle-hardened
fighters from the Syrian theatre could fortify these networks further.
IMPLICATIONS AND OUTLOOK FOR REGIONAL
SECURITY
Effectively tackling potential women and
child returnees is also vital. As was evident in the Surabaya bombings in May
2018, women and children have taken on increasingly prominent roles in jihadi
operations regionally.
Adopting best practices from programmes
used in other countries on this issue could buttress the "tool kit"
of regional counter-terrorism practitioners, although they would need to be
adapted to the Asian context.
The infiltration of non-Southeast Asian
militants into the region to participate in terror attacks, some of whom may
have previously forged links with Southeast Asian IS fighters in Syria and
Iraq, also requires monitoring.
This was evident during the 2017 Marawi
siege, when a number of foreign jihadists were killed in clashes with security
forces, including some Uighurs in Indonesia.
The death of leading Southeast Asian
jihadists such as Hapilon and Akel raises important questions about the future
course of the regional threat landscape, an issue brought more sharply into
focus since the death of al-Baghdadi.
Authorities are expected to closely monitor
who fills the leadership vacuum within jihadist networks in Indonesia, Malaysia
and the Philippines following the death of key leaders in these countries.
Although a new IS Emir in Southeast Asia
has not been clearly designated following the death of Hapilon in October 2017,
local and regional leaders will likely emerge from the group of battle-hardened
fighters who migrated to the Middle East theatre and have since returned.
Potential leaders could also emerge from
the expansive networks of local IS affiliates, supporters and sympathisers
dotted around the region.
The re-emergence of JI is also most likely
to be closely monitored. Since JI’s last attack in the region in 2009, it has
regrouped, and consolidated its position, especially in Indonesia.
JI could consolidate its position further,
especially since many of its key leaders remain alive. These include Yazid
Sufaat, a prominent biochemist and bomb-maker, who was recently released by
Malaysian authorities after almost two decades in custody.
JI’s reinvigoration also provides a
potential well-trodden path for IS’ own resurgence in the region. Possible
tactical alliances, involving JI and pro-IS cells to launch joint attacks, also
cannot be discounted.
Source: Today- 23 January 2020
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